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F RO M THE D I R E C T O R

Ending Injustice: Solving the Initial Appearance Crisis describes a
crisis in post-arrest criminal procedure and offers strategies to end it.
Most Americans believe that, after an arrest, they will quickly
appear before a judge, learn about the charges against them, and
have an attorney assigned to defend them. Unfortunately, this is not
always true. Instead, an arrested person can wait in jail for days,
weeks, or even months before seeing a judge or meeting an attorney.
Detention without access to courts or counsel strikes at the very
core of our expectations about American criminal justice. But the
Supreme Court neither guarantees a prompt initial appearance nor
requires a lawyer’s help at that procedure.
This report chronicles the resulting initial appearance crisis and
highlights its devastating consequences. More importantly, it provides
policymakers and advocates with actionable recommendations.
We hope that Solving the Initial Appearance Crisis helps transform
this critical stage of our criminal legal process.
Sincerely,
Pamela R. Metzger
Director, Deason Criminal Justice Reform Center
SMU Dedman School of Law
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What Should Happen at
an Initial Appearance?

Within 24 hours
of arrest

Arrest

Early legal assistance

Advice of rights

Initial
Appearance
Meaningful
release hearing

Release on
reasonable conditions

Release
Prompt defense of
the case
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iii

E X ECU TI V E S U M M A RY

Consequences of the
Initial Appearance Crisis

!?

Longer pretrial
detention

Loss of housing
and income

Coerced
confessions
and uninformed
waiver of rights

Harm to families
and children

Trauma,
violence, injury,
and illness

Worse case
outcomes

Pleading guilty
without a
lawyer
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Waste of
taxpayer
resources
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E X ECU TI V E S U M M A RY

Recommendations for Ending
the Initial Appearance Crisis
Require initial appearance as soon as
possible, and never more than 24 hours
after arrest
Make system stakeholders accountable
for preventing delay
Provide legal assistance before and
during initial appearance
Deliver clear advice of rights

Make an informed decision about
pretrial release
Within 72 hours, appoint a lawyer to
begin the defense

Study technological adaptations
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Introduction

Because the local court only met four times each year, Jessica
Jauch spent 90 days in jail without seeing a judge or a lawyer.
A false arrest, followed by 48 days in jail without an initial
appearance, left Carl Murdock homeless and destitute.
After begging in vain for a lawyer’s help,18-year-old Trequelle
Vann-Marcouex hanged himself in jail.
Across the United States, people are arrested and held behind bars for
days and weeks—sometimes even for months—without ever seeing a judge
or an attorney. The Constitution promises to protect an arrested person by
giving them access to the courts, notice of the charges, the assistance of a
lawyer, and a fair and speedy trial. But the Constitution is silent about when
or how those rights will be delivered.1
How long can a person be held in jail
before they see a judge? When will they
IN F OC US
learn what crime they are accused of
committing? How long must they wait for
a lawyer to defend them?
The Supreme Court has never anIn the United States, people are
swered any of these questions. As a
presumed innocent—even after an arrest.
result, an arrest thrusts a person into a
It takes proof beyond a reasonable doubt
terrifying procedural limbo that only a
to undo that presumption and convict a
judge or a lawyer can end.2

High stakes but little proof

person of a crime.3
But it only takes probable cause for
police to arrest and detain a person.
Probable cause is far less than
reasonable doubt—it is less than 51%
likelihood of guilt.4
This means that it is harder to repossess rent-to-own furniture or suspend a
child from school than to arrest a person and keep them in jail before they’ve
seen a judge or a lawyer.5
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What Is an Initial Appearance
and Why Does It Matter?
An initial appearance procedure occurs the first time an arrested person
goes to court and sees a judge about their case. Procedures differ from
state to state, but all initial appearances share a common purpose: educating a person about their constitutional protections and allowing them to
exercise their constitutional rights.6
At an initial appearance, the judge should advise a defendant of their
rights and tell them about the charges that they face.7 The initial appearance
triggers the constitutional right to counsel and is a defendant’s first chance
to contest the charges.8 Often, it is also a defendant’s first opportunity for
pretrial release.9
While waiting for their initial appearance to happen, a person can spend
IN F OC US
weeks—or even months—in jail, without
seeing a judge, learning about their rights,
or meeting a lawyer.10 Without an initial
appearance, they have no opportunity to
argue for pretrial release or to investigate
States use different
their case. Witnesses’ memories may fade,
terms for the first postand essential evidence may disappear.
Meanwhile, a defendant may lose their job,
arrest court appearance.
11
home, or family.
Common terms include:

Different states,
different terms

THE INITIAL APPEARANCE CRISIS



•

initial appearance

•

first advisement

•

magistration

•

arraignment

•

presentment

•

first appearance
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The Importance of a
Prompt Initial Appearance
A prompt initial court appearance, with the assistance of counsel,
is essential to fulfilling the Constitution’s promises because it:

Prevents secret detentions and interrogations
Before the initial appearance, police exercise absolute power and control
over an accused person. Arrest and detention isolate a defendant, making
them more susceptible to police interrogation. An initial appearance protects against this coercion. It alerts a judge about a person’s arrest, keeps
the public informed about police practices, and prevents the police from
using a delay to extract a confession.

Gives an arrested person important information
and advice
Until the initial appearance, police and jailers are an arrested person’s only
sources of “advice.” An initial appearance connects a defendant with a
judge who can provide neutral oversight of the process. The judge tells a defendant about the reason for their arrest and advises them about their constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.

Triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to an attorney arises at the initial appearance.
So, a prompt initial appearance promotes prompt access to an attorney.
Importantly, a defendant who is represented by a lawyer is far more likely to
be released before trial than a defendant who appears in court alone. Early
representation by an attorney also promotes prompt investigation and more
effective advocacy, leading to better case outcomes.

Facilitates a person’s prompt release from jail
The initial court appearance is, in most cases, a person’s first opportunity
for pretrial release. A person who is released from jail can maintain their
employment and their family and community ties. They can also meet freely
with their lawyer and help prepare a defense. The sooner a person is released, the faster they can begin to repair their life.
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A Shocking Reality: What
Really Happens After Arrest
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Fact v. Fiction

Most people believe that, after an arrest, a person will quickly go to court
and get a lawyer to defend them. But in our overcrowded and under-resourced criminal legal system, this is simply not true.
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained what kind of initial appearance the Constitution requires, and state laws vary.12 Some states have laws
that defy our expectations about fairness. Other states require fair process
but do not monitor compliance, allowing local courts to disregard the rules.13
The result is a dismal patchwork of procedural rules, with too few constitutional guidelines and a wide range of inconsistent state laws. People
in one state may receive far less initial appearance process than people in
another state.

D ATA S N AP S H O T
States have very different initial appearance rules.14
 24 hours or less

 24 hour with limitations
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 2 – 7 days

WHAT REALLY HAPPENS

 No firm deadline

5

The law allows detention for days,
weeks, or even months, without a
court appearance
In many places, a newly arrested person can spend days, weeks—or
even months—in jail without ever seeing a judge or learning about their
rights. Yet, state laws allow this unfairness.
For example, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana allow three days between
a person’s arrest and their first appearance, but weekends and holidays do
not count.15 Connecticut and Massachusetts only require that a defendant’s
first court appearance occur at the next available court session, regardless
of how long that may take.16
Thirty-three states have no clear timeline for providing an incarcerated
person with an initial appearance.17 They only require that an initial appearance occur “without unnecessary delay,” “as soon as practicable,” or “within a reasonable time.”18

IN FO CU S

When three days becomes a week19
While Louisiana law says the initial appearance must occur within three days of
arrest, but holidays and weekends do not count toward that time limit.

Initial
Appearance

Arrest
Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Wed

Thu

Fri

Sat

Sun

Mon

Tue

Wed

1st

2nd

(Weekend)

(Weekend)

(Holiday)

(Holiday)

3rd

Day

Day
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J ES S I CA J A U C H ’ S S T O RY

90 days in jail without a judge or a lawyer
Relying on a secret informant,
a grand jury in Choctaw County,
Mississippi, indicted Jessica Jauch
on felony drug charges and issued a
warrant for her arrest. No one notified
Ms. Jauch about the charges.
One day, the police stopped Ms.
Jauch for a traffic violation and
discovered the outstanding warrant.
The police arrested Ms. Jauch and took
her to jail.

In short order, Ms. Jauch’s attorney
reviewed the surveillance video. But
it only showed Ms. Jauch borrowing
$40 from her “friend” who was acting
as a police informant. The attorney
contacted the prosecutor, who
dismissed all charges.
Ms. Jauch had been innocent all
along.

Insisting that she knew nothing
about the charges, Ms. Jauch begged
jail officials to let her go to court or
post bail. But before she could post
bail, she needed to appear before a
judge who could set bail.
At that time, Mississippi law said
that Ms. Jauch’s initial appearance
could wait until “the next term of
court.” But the Choctaw County court
only met four times per year, and the
timing of Ms. Jauch’s arrest meant
that the next term of court was three
months away.

Arrest

90 days

After 90 days in jail, Ms. Jauch finally
had her first court appearance. The
judge explained the charges, set bail,
and appointed an attorney. Six days
later, Ms. Jauch posted bail and went
home.
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Initial
Appearance

7

Police, jailers, judges, and lawyers
violate initial appearance deadlines
Many defendants wait in jail without a court appearance long past the
legal deadline, no matter what the law requires.21 Some of these over-detentions are isolated instances of malpractice or oversight. Others are simply
accepted—albeit illegal—patterns of local practice. There are even fill-inthe-blank legal forms that defendants can use to complain about being
jailed without an initial appearance.22

Presumptively innocent people
languish in dangerous jails
For most defendants, the initial
appearance is their first opportunity for
pretrial release. Every day of delay in the
initial appearance means another day of
detention.
The law says that accused people
are presumed to be innocent.23 But their
experiences in jail suggest that these
pretrial detainees are already being punished—even before they have seen a
judge or a lawyer.
People who are in jail cannot work
or meet their family obligations. They
are frightened about what may happen,
and—because they have not had an
initial appearance—they have little information about the legal process.24
Additionally, jails are violent, cramped,
and frightening places. A person who is
in jail before trial may suffer long-term
trauma or physical injury.25

In the largely
underground Hamblen
County Jail, detainees,
shackled at the ankles,
overflow from mold- and
mildew-infested cells, and
some sleep nearly naked
on the concrete jail floor.
Many human beings are
chained to benches, door
handles, poles, and their
own wheelchairs.”26

Hamblen County,
Tennessee
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Defendants receive incomplete or
confusing information about their rights
Without an attorney to help them,
defendants may receive incomplete or
confusing information at their initial appearance. For example, a judge may only
give a partial explanation of a defendant’s
rights, skipping over those that are “inconvenient” or expensive, such as the right to
a court-appointed defense lawyer.27
Sometimes, a judge reads a list of
constitutional rights to a room full of
defendants rather than advising each
person individually.28 Elsewhere, the advice of rights is prerecorded and played
in the jail or courthouse. No one asks if
each defendant heard—much less understood—those rights.29

D ATA SNAP SHOT

Advice of Rights
In a five-county study, less than half of
the defendants were told about their
right to counsel when a judge delivered
the advice of rights.30

49.1%

50.9%

Told of Right
to Counsel

Not Told of Right
to Counsel

Defendants appear in court without a
lawyer to help them
Although the initial appearance triggers a person’s right to counsel, the
Supreme Court has said that there is no right to have an attorney’s help
at the initial appearance itself.31 The Court has never explained when a
lawyer must be assigned or how quickly they must begin to work on the
defendant’s case. The Court has only said that a lawyer must be appointed
within a “reasonable” time after the initial appearance and must assist in
“any critical stage” of the proceedings.32
Many states do not provide indigent defendants with an attorney at initial
appearance.33 Instead, defendants stand in court alone, with no one to
speak for them. They do not know whether their arrest was legal, much less
how to argue for their release. Weary and frightened, they are left to fend for
themselves.34
THE INITIAL APPEARANCE CRISIS
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RA CI EL Z A LVA Z A L D I VA R- P ROE NZA’S STORY

Facing the prosecution alone
Raciel Zalva Zaldivar-Proenza
was arrested for sexual assault.
A prosecutor was in court for the
initial appearance, but Mr. ZaldivarProenza—who did not speak English—
was unrepresented. The judge agreed
to appoint an attorney to defend him,
but not until the next court appearance.

35

No one took pictures that might have
shown other barbed wire injuries. And
because there was no defense lawyer
watching, no one could object if the
lighting and camera angles skewed the
pictures to fit the prosecution’s case.
At trial, those photos were the only
evidence that corroborated the state’s
witness. A jury convicted Mr. ZalidarProenza, and a judge sentenced him
to six-and-a-half
years in jail.

Mr. Proenza had scratches on his
arms. The prosecution claimed that
those scratches
came from
grappling with
As one
the complaining
The verdict might
Minnesota
witness. Mr.
Supreme Court
have been different
Proenza tried
Justice explained,
to explain that
had Zaldivar-Proenza’s
the prosecution’s
he had been
36
request “presented
counsel been present.”
injured at work
a legal problem,
handling barbed
one that Zaldivarwire, but the
Proenza, a nonjudge told him
English-speaking layperson, was illto wait and speak to his attorney.
equipped to understand without the
Invoking complex procedural rules
aid of counsel. The absence of counsel
that Mr. Proenza could not understand,
during the hearing meant that Zaldivarthe prosecutor made a motion to take
Proenza lost the benefit of having his
pictures of his arms. With no lawyer
attorney inspect and preserve the
there to object on his behalf, the judge
evidence for trial.”
granted the motion.
The prosecution only took pictures
that supported their theory of the case.
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Poor defendants struggle to get a
court-appointed lawyer
Although the Constitution promises the assistance of counsel, indigent
defendants struggle to get the court-appointed lawyer they deserve. It is not
simply that some judges discourage them from asserting their right to counsel. Local rules may also play a part in this injustice.
Many places require an arrested indigent person to submit a written
application for legal assistance.37 This delays the appointment of counsel.38
Even getting the application can be challenging.39 In some courthouses,
the judge only provides the application after the initial appearance is over.40
Elsewhere, defendants must request the application from their jailers. For
illiterate defendants or non-English speakers, these forms may present an
insurmountable hurdle.
In some places, indigent defendants must also pay public defender application fees, ranging from $10 to $400.41

D ATA S N AP S H O T
In Beaufort County, South Carolina, the
court makes defendants wait in jail for ten
days before giving them a form to apply for
appointed counsel.42

Beaufort County, SC

Arrest
Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

Day

1

6
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Form
Provided
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It may be weeks before an attorney
begins to work on the case
The lawyer who assists a defendant at the initial appearance may not be
the attorney who will handle the case through plea or trial. Instead, a “duty
lawyer” or “lawyer for the day” may handle the initial appearance, and another lawyer will be appointed to defend against the charges.43
Often, a duty lawyer has no further interaction with a defendant.44 If so,
after the initial appearance, a defendant will be effectively unrepresented until
another lawyer is assigned.45 Particularly in rural areas, where there is a severe
shortage of criminal lawyers, it may be a long time before that happens.46
Even when an attorney is finally assigned, that does not mean that they
are actively working on the case or communicating with the defendant.47
They may have too many cases, or work too far away, to turn their attention
to a new client. So a defendant must wait for help.
What is a “reasonable” amount of time for a defendant to wait in jail for
someone to actually start to defend them? The Supreme Court has never
said.48 Perhaps, as a result, courts have denied relief to defendants who
were held in jail for several weeks before the appointment of a lawyer.49

D ATA S N AP S H O T
Courts have denied appellate, civil, and post-conviction relief to defendants who
waited weeks for a lawyer’s help.50

Clark v. State

Grogen v. Gautreaux

35

40

Commonwealth v. Padilla

Hawkins v. Montague Cty

47

60

days

days

days
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Bias and inequity impose unequal
burdens on defendants of different
races and ethnicities
The initial appearance crisis does not impact all races and ethnicities
equally. Data on arrests, jail populations, and pretrial detention demonstrate
a disproportionate impact on Black and African-American populations.51
In 2019, Black people made up 26.6% of arrests nationwide,52 but represented only 13.4% of the total United States population.53 Statistics on jail
inmates in 2019 showed that Black people were incarcerated in jail at a rate
(600 per 100,000) of more than three times the rate of White people (184 per
100,000).54 Not only is a larger proportion of the Black population in jail, but
available research shows that Black people are far more likely to be detained before trial than White people.55

DATA S N AP S H O T
The Prison Policy Initiative reports that: 56
In large urban areas, Black
felony defendants are over

Young Black men
are about

25%

50%

more likely than white
defendants to be held pretrial.

more likely to be detained
pretrial than white defendants.

Across the country, Black and
brown defendants are at least

Black and brown defendants
receive bail amounts that are

10 – 25%

2x as high

more likely than white defendants
to be detained pretrial or to
have to pay money bail.

as bail set for white
defendants—and they are less
likely to be able to afford it.
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Dire Consequences
for Delayed, Defective,
and Uncounseled Initial
Appearances
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

Longer pretrial detention
In most places, the initial appearance is a defendant’s first opportunity for pretrial release.57 So, when the initial appearance is delayed, a defendant spends more time in jail.
Whether a defendant will remain in jail depends heavily on a lawyer making a meaningful pretrial release argument. A defendant who does not have a
lawyer at this vital hearing is far more likely to be detained before trial.58 A defendant who only meets their lawyer at initial appearance may fare no better.
If the first attorney-client meeting happens during the initial appearance,
the lawyer knows nothing about the defendant or their circumstances.59
As a result, they cannot present the judge with solid evidence favoring the
defendant’s release.60
A meaningful argument about release
will have to wait until a lawyer meets with
the defendant, learns about their life, and
D ATA SNAP SHOT
presents evidence to the judge. But by
that point, the lawyer is fighting an uphill
After three New York Counties provided
battle. They are asking a judge to reverse
counsel at first appearance, there were
an existing order, which often requires a
dramatic increases in release at initial
higher standard of legal proof.61 In othappearance.62
er words, it is harder to modify a pretrial
release decision than to get the ruling right
58%
at the initial appearance.
47%
46%
41%
27%

7%
“Bleek”
County

“Lake”
County

“Hudson”
County

Percentage of people released
at initial appearance
 Before (without counsel)
 After (with counsel)
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

Coerced confessions and
uninformed waiver of rights
When a person is jailed without seeing a judge or a lawyer, they may
quickly become demoralized. They are scared about their legal case
and at risk of violence from other inmates. There is no help in sight.
If they receive confusing, incomplete, or misleading information about
their rights, defendants may make unforced legal errors.63 Some people confess—even to crimes that they never committed.64 Other defendants accidentally give up their legal rights simply because they did not know enough
to assert them.65 The longer the delay in seeing a judge and a lawyer, the
greater the risk that a desperate defendant will make mistakes that cannot
be fixed.

C O N S EQ U E N C E

Trauma, violence, injury, and illness
Delay in initial appearance means a delay in pretrial release. Even
short periods of pretrial detention can cause significant physical, emotional, and financial harm. Jails can be overcrowded and dangerous. A
defendant who is detained before trial can be assaulted, injured, raped, or
killed.66
Even the healthiest people can become sick in jail. Respiratory illnesses,
like Covid-19, spread quickly in confined spaces.67 And because jails are
not intended to address severe mental and physical illness, any pre-existing
conditions may worsen.68 Mental health conditions may become acute, and
people who are detained face an increased risk of suicide.69
Detention without an attorney can exacerbate these problems. Yet,
there is no one who can bring these issues to a judge’s attention or argue
for relief.

THE INITIAL APPEARANCE CRISIS
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T REQ U EL L E VA N N - M A R COUE X’S STORY

Life and death consequences

70

Trequelle “Tre” Vann-Marcouex was
only 18 years old when he died in jail in
rural Wood County, Wisconsin.
At Mr. Vann-Marcouex’s initial
appearance, he qualified for a courtappointed attorney. But the local public
defender had a conflict of interest. In
Mr. Vann-Marcouex’s rural community,
it was difficult to find another lawyer
who could represent him.

Mr. Vann-Marcouex was at a loss. He
was just a teenager. He knew how to
play video games—not how to crossexamine witnesses.
Addressing the bewildered youth,
the judge said, “you do have the right
to ask questions . . . although if you
had an attorney here, they would tell
you not to do so because anything you
say is being recorded here today on the
record and could be used against you.”

Twelve days after his arrest, Mr.
Vann-Marcouex was brought back
Mr. Marcouex asked no questions,
to court for a
the prosecution
high-stakes
won the hearing,
preliminary
and the judge
In
2018,
suicide
was
the
hearing. If the
sent Mr. Vannleading cause of death in
prosecution’s
Marcouex back
evidence was
to jail. Less than
local jails.71
insufficient, the
12 hours later, Mr.
judge would
Vann-Marcouex
dismiss the case
attempted
and release Mr. Vann-Marcouex. But Mr.
suicide. He died in a hospital five days
Vann-Marcouex did not have a lawyer
later.
to represent him at that hearing.
Although Mr. Vann-Marcouex never
The judge did not postpone the
knew it, help had been on the way. After
hearing or try to find a lawyer to help
12 days and more than 300 phone calls,
the teenager. Instead, he allowed the
a lawyer had finally agreed to take Mr.
prosecution to call witnesses to testify
Vann-Marcouex’s case. It was simply
against Mr. Vann-Marcouex and forced
too little, too late.
him to represent himself.
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

Pleading guilty without a lawyer

!?

Unsure when they will see an attorney or for how long they will be in
jail, thousands of defendants simply give up. They plead guilty at initial
appearance—before they have ever spoken to a lawyer.72 In some places, judges pressure defendants to proceed without a lawyer. A judge
may tell the defendant that hiring a lawyer or requesting a court-appointed
lawyer will delay their release from jail.73 Or a judge may promise probation
and immediate release from jail—but only if
the defendant gives up their right to have a
lawyer’s advice.74
IN F OC US
The hearings often last seconds and
rarely more than a few minutes. Arrestees
are instructed not to speak and are not
offered any opportunity to submit evidence
of their relative ability to post bond. ProsA defendant may plead guilty, thinking
ecutors routinely offer time-served plea
that they are putting the court case
bargains at the hearing, and arrestees are
behind them, only to discover later
under immense pressure to accept the plea
deals or else remain incarcerated for days
that they face lifelong collateral
75
or weeks until they are appointed a lawyer.
consequences. Those consequences
At this early stage, no lawyer has
can include deportation, forfeiture of a
investigated the case or explored any
professional license, disqualification for
defense to the charges. No lawyer has
some types of employment, or the loss
advised the defendant about the wisdom of
of government benefits. Unfortunately,
taking a plea deal. Yet, a defendant’s guilty
it is almost impossible to undo these
plea—even to a misdemeanor—can have
76
lifelong consequences.
uncounseled convictions.77

Long term consequences
for hasty guilty pleas

C O N S EQ U E N C E

Loss of income and housing
A person who is detained before trial can lose their job. As a result,
they can fall behind on rent, car payments, and other bills. They may
damage their credit rating, lose rent-to-own furniture, default on loan
payments, or face eviction from their home.78
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CA RL M UR D O C K ’ S S T O RY

Wrongful arrest, delayed initial appearance,
and financial ruin
79

On June 19, 2014, Alabama police
arrested Carl Murdock, Jr. and booked
him into the Montgomery County jail.
After several days without an initial
appearance, Mr. Murdock began to ask
the jail staff for help. They told him that
the judge assigned to his case would
be on vacation in July. Unless Mr.
Murdock was brought to court soon, he
would have to wait until August.
Forty-eight days later, on August
6, 2014, Mr. Murdock finally had his
initial appearance. The judge was
shocked by his prolonged detention
and horrified to discover that his arrest
was a mistake. The warrant for Mr.
Murdock’s arrest was due to a clerical
error.

weeks of income. Mr. Murdock
defaulted on a loan and was forced
into bankruptcy. His roommate sold Mr.
Murdock’s personal belongings and
kicked him out of their apartment. Even
his car was repossessed.
If Mr. Murdock had gone to court
or seen a lawyer immediately after
his arrest, none of that would have
happened.
Instead, after seven weeks of
detention without an initial appearance,
Mr. Murdock was financially ruined.

The judge ordered Mr. Murdock’s
immediate release. But Mr. Murdock’s
prolonged detention had caused him
great harm. Among other things, he had
been fired from his job at the Veteran’s
Administration hospital.
With the judge’s help, Mr. Murdock
persuaded his boss to rehire him. But
Mr. Murdock suffered other financial
harms that were not so easy to fix.
During 48 days of wrongful
detention, Mr. Murdock lost several
THE INITIAL APPEARANCE CRISIS
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

Harm to families and children
Family members, especially children, suffer emotional strain and
uncertainty when a loved one is in jail. Maintaining contact is difficult. Inperson visits can be costly and may conflict with a child’s school hours
or a spouse’s work schedule. Video and telephone visits may be equally
challenging.
Private contractors charge exorbitant rates for family phone calls and
video visits. In some places, the first-minute phone call rates can be as high
as $6.50, and a 15-minute call can cost much as $24.80.80

I N FO CU S

The high cost of maintaining family ties
High rates and charges for
inmate calling services can impede the
ability of families to stay connected
by making it prohibitively expensive
for inmates and their families to stay
in touch. This can have devastating
impacts. Regular contact with family
has been shown to reduce inmate
recidivism, and children who stay in
touch with an incarcerated parent
exhibit fewer disruptive and anxious
behaviors. These and other benefits
cannot be realized if the rates and
charges for inmate calling services are
excessive, especially given that inmates’
families typically bear the burden of
paying for these important calls.”81
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

Worse case outcomes
A delay in holding an initial appearance or appointing a lawyer
can contribute to worse case outcomes.83 Investigative delays can
permanently damage a defendant’s chance to defeat the charges. As
time passes, evidence can disappear, and witnesses’ memories may
fade. When an attorney finally begins to work on the defendant’s behalf, it
may be too late for them to prove their client’s innocence.84
Problems that begin with delayed and uncounseled initial appearances—
such as extended pretrial incarceration or
the waiver of rights—can have other longterm consequences for a defendant’s case.
IN F OC US
People who experience lengthy pretrial
detentions are more likely to be convicted
and to receive longer sentences.85

Short delays, long term
consequences
Even short delays can make things
worse. Studies have found that more
than three days of pretrial detention
can increase a person’s likelihood of
conviction by 13%.85
Pretrial detention also has a significant
impact on sentencing. Pretrial detention
can increase minimum felony sentences
by 157 days and misdemeanor sentences
by 19 days.86

DATA S N A P S H O T
According to a study in Wichita County, TX, defendants who made bond
experienced: 87

30%

333%

54%

better chance of having
all charges dismissed

better chance of having a
deferred adjudication

fewer jail days sentenced
to incarceration
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C O N S EQ U E N C E

$$ $

Waste of taxpayer resources
Delayed initial appearances increase pretrial detention, wasting scarce
government resources. This unnecessary pretrial incarceration comes
with a high price tag for criminal legal systems and the communities they
serve. Jails are expensive to run and challenging to operate. Jails must have
enough money to staff their facilities and provide accused people with food,
medication, safe housing, and recreational opportunities.88
In addition, incarceration reduces tax revenues that a person would otherwise have paid in income, property, and sales tax. While they are detained,
a person can lose their job and be unable to support their family, forcing
taxpayers to spend more on social and public services.89 Every additional
day that a person spends in jail imposes more costs.

D ATA S N A P S H O T

According to a 2017 report by the Pretrial Justice Institute:90

63% of the total U.S. jail
population is awaiting trial

?

Costing U.S. taxpayers

$38 million
$

per day

$

$ $

THE INITIAL APPEARANCE CRISIS



CONSEQUENCES

22

Steps to End the Initial
Appearance Crisis
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What Should Happen at
an Initial Appearance?
To resolve the initial appearance crisis, we need a prescription for
success. Fortunately, we know what should happen at an initial appearance:

Within 24
hours
of arrest

A person should have their initial appearance as soon as
possible after an arrest, but never more than 24 hours later.
A prompt initial appearance informs a defendant about their
rights, triggers the right to counsel, and minimizes unfair and
unnecessary pretrial detention.

Early legal
assistance

A defendant should have a lawyer’s help before and during their
initial appearance. The lawyer should meet with the defendant,
learn about their circumstances, and use that information to
argue for release. The lawyer should also warn the defendant
against making any statements.

Advice of
rights

A judge should provide the defendant with an advice of rights
and tell them about the charges they face. The rights should
be communicated individually, and in the language spoken by
the defendant. The judge should confirm that the defendant
understands those rights.

Informed
release
hearing

At the release hearing, the judge should hear arguments from
both sides. The judge should scrutinize the prosecution’s case
to be sure that their evidence is sufficient. The defense attorney
should educate the judge about the defendant’s personal
circumstances and argue for their release.

Release on
reasonable
conditions

The judge should release the defendant on their own
recognizance or set bail conditions. Any bail amount should be
affordable, and any conditions of release should be reasonable.
The defense attorney should notify the defendant’s friends and
family in order to expedite the release.

Prompt
defense of
the case

If the initial appearance lawyer is assigned for that day only,
an attorney should also be assigned to handle the defense.
Within 72 hours, that attorney should meet with the defendant
and begin to investigate the facts, file motions, negotiate a plea
bargain, or prepare for trial.
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Steps to End the Initial
Appearance Crisis
The United States Supreme Court should acknowledge the right to a prompt and
meaningful initial appearance, with the assistance of an attorney before, during, and
after that court hearing. But state and local governments cannot wait for the Supreme
Court to act. They must pass new laws that guarantee post-arrest due process. They
must also draft rules that make criminal justice stakeholders accountable for complying
with the law.
Stakeholders in local criminal legal systems also have the power to implement real
change. Jailers, judges, courts, and prosecutors must work together to design systems
to ensure that a person has a prompt initial appearance or is released from jail. Lawyers
and judges must implement strategies that provide defendants with a lawyer, an informed
bail hearing, and a prompt defense.
Using common sense, cooperation, and commitment, we can end the initial
appearance crisis with six significant reforms.

Require initial appearance as soon as
possible, and never more than 24 hours
after arrest
91

An initial appearance should be held as soon as possible, but never longer than 24 hours after arrest. A speedy initial appearance gives
defendants a fair shot at prompt release, which can help to reduce the
harms associated with pretrial incarceration.
Holding an initial appearance within 24 hours minimizes the likelihood
of coerced confessions. It also expedites a person’s pretrial release and
improves their chances of success at trial.
Replacing vague standards such
as “without excessive delay” with a
strict 24-hour time limit would also
have systemic benefits. Police, jailLong-term outcomes are
ers, judges, and prosecutors would
have clear rules to follow. And providconsiderably worse for defendants
ing counsel within 24 hours of arrest
held in jail longer than 24 hours,
can reduce system costs and mitieven if they are later released.” 93
gate jail crowding.92
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Make system stakeholders accountable
for preventing delay
Rules establishing fair initial appearance procedures can only help if
they are followed. Criminal justice actors should have both the power
and the responsibility to enforce a 24-hour initial appearance rule. State
law should require sheriffs, police chiefs, and jailers to notify the responsible court or prosecutor if a person is detained more than 24 hours without an initial appearance.
State law should also provide immediate solutions for any detention
without appearance or the appointment of counsel. If a judge knows
about an unlawful initial appearance delay but refuses to do anything
about it, a jailer should be required to release the defendant.
When mistakes occur, stakeholders should gather to brainstorm solutions that will prevent errors. Discovering the cause of initial appearance
injustice should be treated as an opportunity for growth and change.94
However, stakeholders who routinely ignore a 24-hour rule, refuse to
appoint defense counsel, or neglect their other legal obligations should
be held accountable. There should be no immunity from paying civil
damages if police, sheriffs, jailers, or judges are complicit in initial appearance delays.
Additionally, lawyers who provide public defense services must boldly
insist on providing effective assistance of counsel. Chief public defenders must demand time and space for
lawyers to meet privately with defendants before the initial appearance.
I N FO CU S
They must also provide defendants
with a lawyer who can start to work
Maine requires jailers to act
on their defense right away.95 If no
In Maine, an initial
lawyers are available, or if the available lawyers have too many cases
appearance must occur
to provide real assistance, a judge
within 48 hours of arrest.
must immediately be notified.96 LitigaIf 36 hours pass without
tion should also be filed seeking the
an initial appearance, the
release of people who are detained
defendant’s jailer must notify
without representation.97

the prosecution about the impending
deadline. If 48 hours expire without an
initial appearance, a jailer “shall release
the defendant from custody or bring the
defendant forthwith before the court for
appearance.”98
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R U DY RI V E R A’ S S T O RY

Why accountability matters

99

The criminal legal system failed
Rudy Rivera.
Mr. Rivera was arrested in California
and sent to Nevada, where he faced
marijuana-related charges. At his
initial appearance in California, Mr.
Rivera had a lawyer who handled the
transfer hearing. But that lawyer had
no responsibility for the case in Nevada
and never checked to be sure that a
lawyer was waiting there.

If the law required jail staff to report
detentions without initial appearance,
things might have been different.
Instead, Mr. Rivera lost a year of his life
to a private prison’s indifference. Each
day of that detention, the prison earned
more money.

Arrest

The U.S. Marshals took Mr. Rivera
to Nevada, but there were no available
beds in a federal facility. So the
Marshals paid for Mr. Rivera to go to a
private prison.
Weeks—and then months—went by,
but Mr. Rivera never went to court. Mr.
Rivera asked prison staff for help. But Mr.
Rivera’s jailers told him he had to wait for
the federal officers to come get him.

355
days

After 355 days, Mr. Rivera finally had
his first appearance in Nevada—but
only because he had been able to reach
a public defender to explain his plight.
After the prosecution dropped the
charges, Mr. Rivera sued the federal
government and the private prison
corporation. The private prison denied
all wrongdoing.
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Provide legal assistance before and
during the initial appearance
An attorney’s assistance is critical to protect a defendant’s rights and
set fair release terms. As a practical matter, meaningful representation at
an initial appearance requires the time and space for a private attorneyclient conversation before the defendant sees the judge.100
Meeting with an attorney before the initial appearance minimizes
a defendant’s anxiety and educates them about the criminal process.
It also allows the defense lawyer to learn about the defendant’s
circumstances and contact friends, family members, and employers who
can support the defendant’s motion for release.
In contrast, if a lawyer’s first meeting with a defendant occurs at
the actual court appearance, the lawyer will know nothing about the
defendant or their circumstances. As a result, the lawyer will not be able
to make a compelling argument for the defendant’s release.

D ATA S N A P S H O T

A study of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, predicted that providing an
attorney within 24 hours of arrest would save public funds.101

Close

22 jail units

Save between

$12,700,000 and
$43,900,000 per year
$43.9
$12.7

million

million
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Make an informed decision about
pretrial release
The Constitution requires that pretrial release considerations be individually tailored to each defendant’s situation. The charges are only one
of many factors that a judge must consider. The judge must also evaluate the defendant’s background, employment, ties to the community,
and financial circumstances.102
But a judge can only consider the information that is before them.
Police tell the judge about the charges and provide a criminal history “rap
sheet.” Without a defense attorney, there is no one to contest the charges
or identify errors in the rap sheet.
Perhaps more importantly, only
In New York State, at least 2.1
a well-informed defense lawyer
million people have rap sheets
can provide vital information that
that are inaccurate, incomplete,
will result in a fair release deci103
sion. Background information
or misleading.104
supplied by a pretrial services
officer will not suffice. Only the defense lawyer has a constitutional obligation to take the defendant’s side.
At the pretrial release hearing, the judge should listen to the lawyer’s
arguments and, whenever possible, release the defendant without requiring cash bail. If cash bail is required, the lawyer must ensure that
the judge selects a truly affordable amount. No one should remain in jail
simply because they are poor.

DATA S N A P S H O T
When Alameda County, California,
provided counsel before and during
initial appearance, the number
of people released increased
dramatically.105

1%

Before:
of defendants
released at initial appearance
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Deliver clear advice of rights
The judicial advice of rights should be standardized to cover a list of
mandatory topics. A judge should deliver those rights individually. If English is not a defendant’s first language, an interpreter should be provided.
As a judge reads the rights, they should stop to ensure that the defendant understands. Video recordings or speeches made to a packed
courtroom cannot do this important work.
The entry of a guilty plea at initial appearance should be handled with
particular caution. A judge should be sure that the defendant has met
with an attorney and received meaningful advice about the wisdom of a
plea. A defendant should understand that a guilty plea can have lifelong
collateral consequences, even if the plea is to a misdemeanor or does
not include a jail sentence.

Within 72 hours, appoint a lawyer to
begin the defense
Early investigation is imperative to success in a criminal case, so an
attorney should be appointed as soon as possible to handle the defense,
and never later than 72 hours.106 If a duty lawyer handles the initial appearance, that lawyer should continue to represent the defendant, and conduct
investigation, until the new lawyer takes over.
Once appointed, a lawyer should immediately meet with the defendant
and begin to work on their case. If the defendant is still in jail, the attorney
should make a compelling motion to modify their bail.
The attorney should work quickly to recover photographic and video
materials, such as surveillance videos, traffic cameras, and license plate
readers.107 Otherwise, these crucial materials—which can make or break
a case—may be erased or deleted. The attorney should locate and interviewing witnesses while their recollections are fresh.
If the appointed lawyer has too many cases to provide real assistance,
a judge must immediately be notified.108 Litigation should be filed seeking
the release of a defendant who is detained without representation.109
A defendant subject to accusation after initial appearance is headed for
trial and needs to get a lawyer working, whether to attempt to avoid that
trial or to be ready with a defense when the trial date arrives.” 110
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Study technological adaptations
Remote initial appearances—usually by video—may appear to be
an attractive solution for providing rapid access to courts and counsel.
Remote rural criminal court systems have long relied on telephone and
video communications to conduct initial appearances.111 In the era of
COVID-19, many other courts have launched similar initiatives.112
While remote initial appearances can reduce the time between arrest
and appearance, there is little research about whether these proceedings
are fair and effective. Important questions remain unanswered.113
How can a remote judge know whether a defendant understands their
rights? Can defendants and attorneys have truly private conversations?
Will defendants even be willing to share personal information across a
video screen? How does remote communication impact the likelihood of
release or the conditions set for bail?114
Existing studies suggest cause for
concern. Remote video proceedings can
impair attorney-client trust and impede
DATA S N AP S H O T
private communication.115 Poor camera
angles, bad lighting, or brief internet
Remote proceedings can
lags may cause a viewer to miss—or
harm defendants
misinterpret—changes in someone’s
demeanor or body language.116 And
After Cook County, Illinois, shifted
without a living, breathing person standto remote initial appearances, bond
ing in front of them, it may be easier for
amounts increased by 51%.118
a judge to set high bail amounts or order
pretrial detention.117
Because of these important concerns about fairness and due process,
remote initial appearances must be
higher
carefully studied and modified—or even
$
abandoned—if they cause more harm
$
$
than good.

51%
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
Before: in person

After: remote
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Conclusion
Conclusion

Lengthy detentions between arrest and a first court
appearance mimic the police “disappearances” so common
under authoritarian regimes.
The Constitution guarantees that no one will be jailed
without access to the courts or an attorney. Yet, the initial
appearance crisis allows people to languish in jail alone,
afraid, and undefended.
But change is possible. At the state and local level,
lawyers, lawmakers, judges, and jailers must honor the
Constitution’s promises and end the initial appearance crisis.
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The Deason Center’s Initial Appearance
Campaign supports state and local reform.

Deason Center
Stats. Stories. Change.

Our experts are available to:
• Testify about the initial appearance crisis and
its solutions.
• Consult with advocacy groups about strategies
to improve initial appearance practices.
• Review draft legislation and proposed changes
to the rules of criminal practice.
Contact us at DeasonJusticeCenter@smu.edu.
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Learn more about the Deason Center’s
Initial Appearance Campaign and request
expert support for local reform:
Contact us:

Follow us:

DeasonCenter.org

facebook.com/SMULawDeason

(214) 768-2837

@SMULawDeason

deasonjusticecenter@smu.edu

@SMULawDeason

About the Deason Center
The Deason Criminal Justice Reform Center takes a Stats
and Stories approach to criminal justice reform. The Stats: we
collect, analyze, and assess qualitative and quantitative data
about our criminal justice system. The Stories: we uncover,
recount, and amplify the experiences of people who live and
work in that system. Together, these Stats and Stories make a
compelling case for compassionate criminal justice reform.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is at the heart of the
Center’s expertise. We study public defense and appointed
counsel systems, and advocate for best practices in the
delivery of this fundamental right. The Center also studies earlystage criminal process, from a person’s first post-arrest court
appearance through the prosecutorial decisions associated
with screening and charging. Because these early stages of the
criminal process may determine how a case ends, we conduct
research and make recommendations about providing early
access to counsel.
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